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Commercial Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) applications continue to
experience widespread growth since the first commercial UAS flight in 2014
(Federal Aviation Administration [FAA], 2014). Current research indicates the
industry will be worth over six billion USD by 2022 (Grand View Research, 2016).
Despite this growth, two significant challenges face UAS operators: systematic and
reliable identification of hazards in specific operations and achieving a sustainable
return on investment. The two challenges are codependent: loss prevention supports
increased return on investment, and total safety increases productivity reputation
and operational efficiency (Stolzer et al., 2011). Safety performance is challenging
to measure, and it depends upon what does not happen rather than what happens
(Stoop & Deckker, 2012).
The best safety management programs are predictive and practical in their
application exposing the warning signs of accidents, known as 'leading indicators'
(Levenson, 2015; Silver, 2012). However, finding these warning signs is
challenging due to the diverse concepts of operations (CONOPS), the dynamic
nature of remote teaming, and increasingly opaque automation functions.
Purpose
The purpose of this study was to test the application of several accepted
methods and taxonomies to build a Quantum Safety Metrics framework that could
be applied to small commercial UAS. These methods included the 'Sierra Scale'
and 'Accident Prevention Effort' (APE) equation as described in Stolzer et al.
(2011), the Systems Theoretic Accident Model and Process (STAMP) as defined
by Levenson (2004), and the Human Factors Accident Classification System
(HFACS) as defined by (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003).
Each of these methods was used by leveraging the strengths of each
technique. For example, HFACs was used first to identify and classify human
factors; STAMP was used to visualize the non-linear accident pathways and
organize unsafe acts and themes. The APE and Sierra Scale were used to quantify
the value of two novel efforts (effort at the accident and benchmark effort). For this
study, small commercial unmanned aircraft systems are defined as weighing less
than 55 pounds maximum take-off weight, they use commercial off-the-shelf'
technology (COTs), and they are used for commercial purposes.
Problem
Two significant challenges face UAS operators: systematic and reliable
identification of hazards in specific operations and achieving a sustainable
investment return. Even small accidents represent significant erosion of profit
margins and operational efficiency. There is no practical method to predict and
quantify benchmark safety performance. An accident's warning signals are often
hard to see, even for experienced safety professionals (Levenson, 2015; Silver,

Published by Scholarly Commons, 2021

1

International Journal of Aviation, Aeronautics, and Aerospace, Vol. 8 [2021], Iss. 1, Art. 8

2012; Stolzer et al., 2011). There is also a gap between traditional aviation safety
information and UAS operations. New entrants to the UAS industry may find it
challenging to apply conventional aviation safety concepts to diverse and dynamic
UAS CONOPS.
Research Questions and Hypothesis
This study asked three central research questions about the application of
the HFACS, STAMP, The Sierra Scale, and APE in investigating UAS accidents:
1. How practical is the application of the three methods in identifying leading
indicators from UAS accident reports?
Ha1: The application of the three methods in identifying leading indicators from
UAS accident reports is practical.
2. Can the leading indicators determine a benchmark level of accident prevention
by this new combined method?
Ha2. The leading indicators can be used to determine a benchmark level of
accident prevention by this new combined method.
3. Is it possible to determine and calculate the value of leading indicators for
accident prevention effort from this new quantum framework?
Ha3. The new quantum framework makes it possible to determine the value of
leading indicators for accident prevention effort.
Literature Review
UASs are diverse in their application and offer considerable benefits and
costs savings to organizations and the communities they serve, including
humanitarian aid, search and rescue, utility inspection and repair, and disaster relief
(Chowdhury et al., 2017; Lamb, 2019; Wargo et al. 2014). In 2016, the U.S. Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) introduced the long-awaited commercial UAS
operators' certificate, CFR 14, §107. Part 107 provides a faster and significantly
less rigorous process to operate commercial UAS than its predecessor, the CFR 14
§ 333 exemption, which was on a case-by-case basis. The new Part 107 certification
allows an operator to fly a UAS for commercial purposes with some restrictions
including that it must weigh less than 55 pounds, be flown within visual line of
sight, and remain below 400 feet above ground level.
The Part 107 certification requires applicants to answer a set of knowledge
questions, provide identification, and submit and pay for their application.
However, the rules do not require a flight test to confirm competency or offer any
evidence of safety and risk management precautions, enabling a low entry barrier
into the commercial UAS market. The low entry barrier is favorable for the UAS
industry as it supports: a) the ease of gaining commercial certification, b) the high
value the UAS offers, and c) the affordability and accessibility of the platform.
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Many operators may find it challenging to apply conventional aviation
safety resources to the very diverse UAS environment. An operating environment
is defined by MITRE as a user-oriented document that:
describes systems characteristics for a proposed system from a user's
perspective. A CONOPS also describes the user organization, mission, and
objectives from an integrated systems point of view and is used to
communicate overall quantitative and qualitative system characteristics to
stakeholders. (2020, Concept of Operations section)
Predictive Hazard Identification and Leading Indicators
Cost implications of even minor accidents and incidents can be complicated
and can include negligible direct costs to high indirect costs, including loss of
reputation and high-value contracts (Friend & Kohn, 2018; Hollnagel et al.,
2006; Reason, 2016; Stolzer et al., 2011). Usually, accidents are preceded by
warning signs, or 'leading,’ however, these leading indicators must complete many
other operational signals and more obvious safety threats, which can be recognized
by the human operator.
The human operator must determine safety performance by what does not
happen rather than what does; therefore, quantifying safety performance is a
challenge (Friend & Kohn, 2018; Hollnagel, et al., 2006; Reason, 2016; Stolzer et
al., 2011; Stoop & Dekker, 2012). Prominent warning signs are usually ones that
you can see; for example, a broken propeller or a trip hazard is more readily
apparent than a missing procedure or lapsed software update (Leveson, 2015;
Silver, 2012).
A Leading Indicator has been defined as "a warning sign that can be used
in monitoring a safety-critical process to detect when a safety-related assumption
is broken or dangerously weak and that action is required to prevent an accident"
(Levenson, 2015, p. 20). Leading indicators may be measured by actions,
behaviors, and processes (Blair & O'Toole, 2010). They can be categorized into
four areas: flexibility, opacity, just culture, and management commitment (Stolzer
et al., 2011; Wreathall, 1998). Therefore, identifying the 'missing' clues from the
obvious is what safety engineers may describe as the essence of predictive hazard
identification - preventing an accident before it happens (Leveson, 2015).
Safety Management Systems' central function is hazard identification and
safety assurance function (FAA, 2015; Stolzer et al., 2011). While closely
interrelated, both rely on mechanisms such as audits, self-reporting systems,
operational data analysis, anonymous reporting, and other formal and informal
means. Many organizations identify hazards retrospectively, and traditional hazard
identification techniques use rearward-facing data analyses derived from
operational observations primarily from past events. Predictive safety programs
focus on systems within systems, and interactions, identifying leading indicators of
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events based on potential (Levenson, 2015; Stolzer et al., 2011). The optimum
safety performance is achieved with a mix of predictive and reactive safety hazard
identification methods that cope with the unexpected in a diverse operational
environment.
The Concept of Resilience in Safety
Resilience in safety emphasizes proactive "living" and "elastic" processes
that can cope with surprise and unexpected events, rather than traditional reactive
defenses (Hollnagel et al., 2006). Achieving resilient operations begins with
understanding complexity by creating new attitudes and processes that are 'failure
sensitive' and that adapt to commercial pressures even with fiscal constraints
(Woods & Cook, 2002). Resilience means recognizing the non-linear potentiality
of the hazard and absorbing or deflecting its impact so that operations continue with
minimal disruption.
The Concept of Quantum Metrics in Safety
Hazards are 'potentialities' for unsafe outcomes that may 'flow' along either
linear or non-linear pathways. Unsafe outcomes can manifest from interactions
between key actors, including software, hardware, the environment, and 'liveware'
or human interfaces (ICAO, 2009). Although not a mainstream concept in aviation
safety, these potentialities follow quantum principles in complex dynamic systems
where some interactions are undetectable or hidden from the human senses (Brown,
2006; Susskind & Friedman, 2014). Quantum principles are not discussed in
traditional aviation risk management; however, these principles have been
compared to systems in the arts, music, and social sciences – some would suggest
observed life in general (Fischer, 2010; Shimony, 1963).
The Sierra Scale in Safety
The ‘Sierra Scale’ is a positive enabler to guide identifying the leading
safety assurance indicators to enable a predictive response to the ever-changing
operational environment (Stolzer et al., 2011). The Serra Scale involves assigning
a numerical value to each organization's safety programs, initiatives, awards, and
other safety efforts. Each of these programs' value is added together to arrive at a
cumulative value that describes the organization's total accident prevent effort
(APE). The APE defines the numerical values assigned to each safety initiative,
which may be tailored specifically to the organization's size, complexity, and safety
needs (Stolzer et al., 2011).
For this study, applying the Sierra Scale to arrive at a total Accident
Prevention Effort is part of developing a Quantum Safety Program (QSP); this can
be a valuable metric when monitored and maintained within the safety assurance
function of an SMS. In conjunction with resilience methodologies, QSPs support
the central tenant of identifying potentialities. When complex systems fail, the
people, preferably appropriately trained, can adapt to disturbances within the
system and cope with unexpected occurrences (Hollnagel, 1983; Hollnagel et al.,
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2006). This study adopts the APE for programs to measure Accident Prevention
Effort for Risk (APE-R) assessment of unsafe control actions.
The Fuzzy-Logic Risk Matrix
This current study used an adapted 'fuzzy logic' risk matrix based on the
Hazards Effects Management Process (HEMP) (Ahn & Chang, 2016; Yazdi, 2018)
to arrive at the APE-R. The benefit of using this type of risk matrix is that
subjectivity during the risk assessment process is reduced. The elements of a risk
matrix are composed of the individual cells (the risk indices), which are the
likelihood of adverse event occurrence and the severity of consequences caused by
this particular event, and the color codes associated with those cells (FAA, 2017;
Skorupski, 2016; Stolzer et al., 2011). The framework in the Appendix of this
current study contains the risk matrix used for the analysis.
Human Factors Accident Classification System (HFACS)
The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) was
developed for the US Navy and Marine Corps as an accident investigation and data
analysis tool (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). The HFACS methodology has also
been applied to commercial aviation accident investigations (Shappell et al., 2007).
HFACS is a theoretically-based tool specifically developed to define the latent and
active failures implicated in Reason's "Swiss cheese" model to investigate and
analyze human error associated with accidents and incidents (Shappell et al., 2007;
Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003).
HFACS describes four levels of failure, each of which corresponds to
Reason's model's four layers. These include: 1) organizational influences, 2) unsafe
supervision (i.e., middle management), 3) preconditions for unsafe acts, and 4) the
unsafe acts of operators (e.g., aircrew, maintainers, air traffic controllers). Within
the context of this study, the HFACS was used to help classify the unsafe control
actions into unsafe control themes.
The Systems Theoretic Accident Model and Process (STAMP)
The Systems Theoretic Accident Model and Process (STAMP) is a systems
engineering approach to safety analysis. The use of STAMP offers advantages over
other linear safety investigation models; these include: 1) examining the role of
systemic feedback and responses, 2) examining organizational constraints and
socio-technical constraints at various levels, and 3) improving the safety of the
overall system while seeking to identify leading indicators (Allison et al., 2017).
Through the STAMP methodology, process accidents occur due to inadequate
control of constraints on safety behaviors and processes (Levenson, 2004). UAS
operations involve socio-technical systems with complex linear and non-linear
interactions and control and feedback (Levenson, 2004). STAMP has been used in
aviation safety studies to uncover critical insights into system safety. It may assist
in identifying safety issues arising from: (1) component failures, (2) dysfunctional
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interactions among components, and (3) environmental disturbances (Allison et al.,
2017; Levenson, 2004).
Interpreting accident data may be subjective: operators, managers,
engineers, and regulatory agencies have a differing perspective of underlying
contributing and causal factors leading to an accident (Levenson, 2004); therefore,
a recognized model for consistently identifying leading indicators by UAS
operators is imperative. STAMP uses four main concepts, which are interrelated
and dynamic; they are described as a) constraints, b) control loops, c) process
models, and d) levels of control.
STAMP Constraints. Constraints are 'mechanisms' that control or modify
behaviors to block hazards; for example, a password to allow computer access is a
safety constraint that prevents unauthorized use. The STAMP framework offers a
method to identify what and where constraints are required and then build them into
the appropriate locations with the overall system design. The STAMP framework
describes the rationale for the application of constraints as a "...lack of appropriate
constraints necessary to ensure system behavior… constraints are the most basic
concept in STAMP and are emphasized more so than safety events" (Levenson,
2004, pp.252, 254).
Control Loops and Process Models. Control loops and process models in STAMP
relates to three main areas: a) the human controllers (pilots and operators), b) the
automated controllers (the autopilot and automated systems) and, c) the interaction
and feedback that the systems provide to both. The primary purpose of control loops
and process models in STAMP is to support the human supervisory role. Functions
include interacting with displays, controls, alarms, and pop-up windows on
software. Influences that affect the human supervisory role, such as ‘Sociotechnical levels of control,’ include elements of regulations, standards, and
protocols that 'constrain’ the risk in relationships; for example, organizational
hierarchy, communication, and stakeholders' relation (Hollnagel et al., 2006). This
current study used the STAMP framework to visualize linear and non-linear safety
vectors from interactions between software, hardware, environment, and liveware
[human interfaces] (ICAO, 2009; Leveson, 2015).
Methodology
This study used mixed-method, non-experimental research with a parallel
convergence approach using multiple instrumental [multiple case study] and
exemplar case study design (Creswell & Creswell, 2017; Edmonds & Kenedy,
2017). The study examined N = 100 commercial UAS accident reports collected
from several online databases, including the NASA Accident and Incident
Reporting System and Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB). A sample
frame of n = 22 commercial UAS accidents was used to build the risk categories
and one exemplar case study was used to test the APE-R method.
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Thematic Analysis
The study's qualitative part was non-experimental research with a narrative
perspective and multiple case study design (Creswell & Creswell, 2017; Edmonds
& Kennedy, 2017) to support a thematic analysis from the accident narratives.
Concurrently, the researchers used a constant comparison method to support the
findings' generalizability (Edmonds & Kennedy, 2017; Glaser & Strauss, 1967).
The thematic analysis examined contributing causal factors of the accidents using
the HFACS themes to assign the most appropriate unsafe control action (UCA)
label and classifying each UCA into a suitable Unsafe Control Action Theme
(UCAT). Therefore, each accident report analyzed: (1) causal factors, (2) HFACS
themes, (3) UCA name, (4) UCA Value, and (5) UCAT theme value. Fourteen
themes emerged from the thematic analysis. The database is located in Appendix
B.
Quantitative Risk Assessment Using APE & Sierra Scale
A 'fuzzy-logic' risk matrix was used to assign a risk value of each UCA
systematically and cumulatively for each UCAT. This was used as the Qualifying
Effect (QE) inserted into the Sierra Scale equation to determine an Accident
Prevention Effort (APE). This method was based on the Sierra Scale to calculate
APE for safety programs in Stolzer et al. (2011).
Therefore, UCA Risk Value x Frequency of Occurrence = QE, the sum of
the QEs in each UCAT = the APE-R.
There is a critical difference between the APE for safety programs (APE-P)
and the APE for UCAs (APE-R). A high APE in programs is desirable, indicating
positive accident prevention effort, while the opposite is true for UCAs,
representing the risk; therefore, a high APE-R means a high risk. Considering the
dichotomy of a desirable high APE-P, the APE for safety programs must be
analyzed separately to the APE for Unsafe Control Acts [risk] compared to a low
APE-R.
Results and Findings
Thematic analysis of n = 22 UAS accidents revealed Fourteen Unsafe
Control Action Themes (UCATs) with risk values ranging from 25 (most risk) to 6
(least risk). The theme occurrence frequency ranged from 12 to 2; 'inadequate use
of checklist' was the theme with this highest risk value and second highest
frequency. The UCAT was assigned a risk value and entered into the table of
UCATs presented in Figure 1.
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Figure 1
Unsafe Control Action Themes (UCAT) N= 22 accidents

USC Theme Occurance Freqency and Risk Value
25

12. Inadequate Checklist
Inadequate organizational procedures…
Inadequate organizational procedures…
9. Inadequate Checklist application
8. Lack of hardware (aircraft/battery/control…
14. Inadequate Visual observer
5. Inadequate Data entry
4. Distracted/"Screen Bound" Remote Pilot
13. Inexperience in operational area
3. Lack of total system testing
7. Inadequate C2/GPS link integrity test
1. Inadequate/Untested software
6. Lost C2 link
2. Inadequate organizational procedures…

20
20
20

11.
10.

0
Risk Value

16
15
15
15
10
10
9
8
6
6
5

10

15

20

25

30

Frequency

The next step in the parallel-convergent approach was to apply the UCAT
themes risk value to the exemplar case study and visualize risk 'potentialities' using
the STAMP UAS CONOPS to quantify the risk values.
Exemplar Case Study (n = 1)
On September 27, 2016, on the New South Wales Coast of Australia, a
Pulse Aerospace Vapor 55 lost communication and control (C2) signal with the
ground control station and continued to fly un-commanded through busy flight
training airspace with a trajectory into controlled airspace. The incorrect
georeferenced point was programmed into the ground control station (northern
hemisphere instead of the southern hemisphere). The aircraft was never recovered
and it is likely that it impacted the ocean to the northern hemisphere reference point.
Figure 2 is a representation of the exemplar case study CONOPS to visualize hazard
potentialities.
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Figure 2
Quantum Safety Vectors: In the Exemplar Case Study

Note. Diagram adapted from Allison et al. (2017).

Discussion
Typically, mixed methods will present findings and discussions in an
integrated format. As this study progressed, it was determined that an integrated
discussion of the finding was appropriate (APA, 2020).
Hazard Vectors
The regulator is arguably one of the aviation industry's central components,
providing the baseline framework for certification of aircraft components, airspace
classification, operating organizations, and individual pilots. Quantum safety
interactions and safety control pathways can be connected to every aspect of the
operation, along multiple vectors; for example, a) lack of regulation, b) ineffective
regulation, c) misapplied regulation, d) lack of oversight or governance, e)
insufficient resources, f) relevant and appropriate guidance safety guidance, and g)
inadequate infrastructure (e.g., standardized and practical accident, incident
reporting protocols).
Operator Vectors
Safety controls and constraints are often outlined in the organization's
policies and procedures, including the more granular Standard Operating
Procedures (SOPs) and training programs that ensure all crew members'
competency. The organization's top-level management plays a crucial role in
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operating safely. Operators require a formal safety management system that
includes essential components of safety assurance and quality processes.
Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) Vectors.
The OEM often provides foundational guidance and training, which the
organizations usually adapt for their specific CONOPS. Deficiencies in the safety
control interactions between the OEM and the operator has been a causal factor in
some UAS accidents, as cited in our exemplar case study. Therefore, the safety
controls between OEM and operator need to be transparent, flexible, and robust.
Remote Pilots Vectors
The remote pilots are the front-line defense against an accident; however,
as data indicates, the remote pilot's safety controls interact with almost every part
of the system – the regulator, the OEM, the aircraft, the airspace, the organization,
and even the other airspace users. The CONOPS map indicates that while the
remote pilots are at the forefront of the operation, they require robust safety
constraints from all other aspects within and outside the CONOPS system. Table 1
presents the total calculated value of the accident prevention effort using the Serra
Scale for the exemplar case study at the time of the accident.
Table 1
Exemplar Case Study: Using the Sierra Scale to Determine APE-Risk at the time of
the accident.

1.

Inadequate/untested software

Frequency of
theme
occurrences
1

2.

Inadequate organizational procedures (maintenance)

1

3.

Lack of total system testing

10

0

4.

Distracted/" screen bound" remote pilot

15

0

5.

Inadequate Data entry

1

15

15

6.

Lost C2 link

2

6

12

7. Inadequate C2/GPS link integrity test
8.
Lack of hardware (aircraft/battery/control surface)
testing
9. Inadequate checklist application

1

9

9

16

0

2

20

40

10. Inadequate organizational procedures (training all crew)

7

20

140

11. Inadequate organizational procedures (flight)

7

20

140

12. Inadequate checklist

2

25

50

13. Inexperience in the operational area

3

10

30

15

0

Unsafe Control Action Theme (UCATs Exemplar Case
Study)

14. Inadequate visual observer
Total Accident Safety Effort (APE-R) at the time of the
accident
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8

6

6
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Practical Application of APE in Exemplar Case Study.
The total APE-R calculated in the case study was 450 (sum of the
Qualifying Effects (QEs); however, this was a pre-accident value and did not
consider any active safety 'programs' such as APE-P. An example of a total APE-P
is the sum of Safety Programs and Quantifiable Effect expressed as: (P x QE) =
APE-P. The case study narrative did not detail any safety programs; therefore, only
APE-R was assessed. An example of APE-P has been reproduced from Stolzer et
al. (2011) is presented in Table 2.
Table 2
Accident Prevention Effort-Programs (APE-P)
Programs
QE
Active risk management program
3
Monthly newsletter
2
Established safety council
3
Total APE for Programs (APE-P) 8
Note. Table adapted from Stolzer et al. (2011). High APE-P is desirable, representing increased
efforts for accident prevention by safety awareness.

Benchmarking Accident Prevention Effort-Risk (APE-R)
Benchmarking relies on the STAMP CONOPS to visualize the potentialities
of hidden hazards and support preventative safety controls. Controls are then
planned for implementation to calculate the APE-R's value. This new value is used
as a benchmark, against which various target safety levels could be applied
depending on the specific CONOPS.
The new APE value is designated the APE-Risk Benchmark Value (APEBV
R ); the pre-accident APE will be designated APE-Accident Value (APE-AV). The
APE-RBV would be the minimum benchmark value for maintaining safety and risk
management programs. Further research is recommended to confirm the
benchmark APE-RBV values, which would be different in every UAS CONOPS.
For example, UAS operators who work around electrical conductors [higher risk]
may choose to maintain their APE-R below the benchmark by a determined value,
these may be expressed as percentage confidence intervals, or monitoring other
metrics such as standard deviations of specific safety performance parameters.
Benchmarking APE-RBV for the Exemplar Case Study.
UCATs examined in the case study represent the APE-R at the time of the
accident and is designated APE-RAV (Accident Value) versus the proposed
benchmark APE-RBV.(Benchmark Value). The benchmark APE is the calculated
value when all reasonable safety precautions and initiatives are implemented using
the STAMP UAS CONOPS. Table 3 presents the comparison of the APE value at

Published by Scholarly Commons, 2021

11

International Journal of Aviation, Aeronautics, and Aerospace, Vol. 8 [2021], Iss. 1, Art. 8

the time of the accident and the calculated value of the benchmark APE,
representing the level of accident prevention effort that will likely be required for
the effective prevention of accidents and incidents.
Table 3
UCATs Exemplar Case Study at Time of Accident APE-RAV vs. Benchmark APERBV
Frequency
of theme
occurrence
1

UCATs Exemplar Case Study
1. Inadequate/untested software
2.
Inadequate organizational
(maintenance)
3. Lack of total system testing

procedures

1

Risk
Value

QE-

QE-

AV

BV

8

8

0

6

6

10

0

0

15

0

0

3

4.

Distracted/" screen bound" remote pilot

5.

Inadequate Data entry

1

15

15

8

6.

Lost C2 link

2

6

12

8

Inadequate C2/GPS link integrity test
Lack of hardware (aircraft/battery/control
surface) testing
9. Inadequate checklist application
10. Inadequate organizational procedures (training
all crew/CRM)
11. Inadequate organizational procedures (flight)

1

9

9

4

16

0

2

20

40

7

20

140

7

20

140

32

12. Inadequate checklist

2

25

50

50

13. Inexperience in the operational area

3

10

30

27

15

0

7.
8.

14. Inadequate visual observer
APE-R at accident and benchmark value

450

0
18
18

0
AV

168BV

It can be useful to examine the quantifiable effect at the time of the accident
and then compare this to an optimum Quantifiable Effect (QE). The optimum level
would represent a robust approach to hazard identification and risk management.
This study managed to answer all three research questions demonstrating
that a) the HFACS was useful to categorize human error risk factors, b) the STAMP
methodology was useful for visualizing risk vectors and therefore leading
indicators in a specific UAS CONOPS, and c) the basic Accident Prevention Effort
and Sierra Scale equations could be extended to calculate and quantify leading
indicators and establish benchmark values for a quantum safety metric program.
The null hypotheses were rejected, the alternate hypothesis are restated:
Ha1: The application of the three methods in identifying leading indicators
from UAS accident reports is practical.
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Ha2. The leading indicators can be used to determine a benchmark level of
accident prevention by this new combined method.
Ha3. The new quantum framework makes it possible to determine the value
of leading indicators for accident prevention effort.
Limitations
Many UAS accident reports have limited, vague, or ambiguous narratives,
hindering the discovery of possible contributory and causal factors. The qualitative
component of the mixed methods research includes limitations that may be
influenced by the researchers' experiences and subjectivity when interpreting
qualitative data (Creswell & Creswell, 2017). The sample size was small compared
to the total volume of UAS operations globally. This study examined 22 accidents
out of a potential population of hundreds of thousands.
This study did not capture all possible interactions or overlaps; therefore,
this should be addressed in future studies to ensure that any increase in the
occurrence frequency is accurately reflected in both the risk value and the
quantifying effect. The generalizability of applying the UAS STAMP CONOPS
and the UCA themes may be repeated in future studies to assess further if this
method is a reliable and practical method for identifying leading indicators and a
successful model for a quantum safety metrics program.
Recommendations
The International aviation standards published by ICAO, and the Federal
Aviation Administration both recommend maintaining a formal safety management
system focusing on the safety assurance function. These SMS should include a clear
focus on accident and incident reporting forms. There is abundant guidance
material available that describes what components are necessary for an effective
SMS and how one should be implemented. This study revealed that it is possible to
identify and quantify unsafe control acts that lead to an accident, incident, or loss.
Therefore, UAS organizations with a formal SMS should consider building a
quantum safety metrics program. A quantum safety metrics program relies on
applying the STAMP [or similar process map] and the Sierra Scale to provide a
total APE-R and APE-P measure, which may be monitored and compared to the
benchmark APE as part of the safety assurance function.
Conclusions
This study found that it is both plausible and practical to implement a
bespoke quantum safety metrics program for a UAS CONOPS. This was achieved
by extending the Accident Prevention Effort (APE and Sierra Scale) equation
presented in this study. In addition to the basic APE and Sierra Scale, the
researchers used previously validated methods including HFACS (to classify
human error), and STAMP (to visual risk vectors). This new quantum framework
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extended the existing APE to achieve four new outcomes: a) support leading
indicator identification, b) calculate an accident prevention effort for safety
programs (APE-P), and c) calculate an accident prevention effort for Risk (APER), and finally, d) Calculate a total accident prevention effort as a benchmark value
or a target (APE-BV).
This study showed it was practical to use both HFACS and STAMP, for
designing and quantifying predictive accident prevention efforts. Furthermore, this
study extended the basic APE and Sierra Scale to support calculating a metric
variance to target accident prevention efforts above a benchmark value (APE-RBV)
for a particular type of UAS environment. Commercial UAS operations may benefit
from implementing the quantum safety methodology presented in this study and
gain tangible benefits from increased operational safety and a more stable
investment return.
Acknowledgement: The authors acknowledge and thank Dr. Alan Stolzer, Dean
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Appendix A
Unmanned Systems Aircraft Accident and Incident Data Sources
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

"www.asias.faa.gov › apex

https://www.faa.gov/uas/resources/public_records/uas_sightings_report/
https://aviation-safety.net/database/issue/dronedb.php
https://www.ntsb.gov/_layouts/ntsb.aviation/index.aspx
https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rpsts/uav.pdf
UAS sighting data: a mixture of quantitative and qualitative data. Source:
https://www.faa.gov/uas/resources/public_records/uas_sightings_report/
7. Part
107
waiver
data:
Qualitative
data.
Source:
https://www.faa.gov/uas/commercial_operators/part_107_waivers/waiv
ers_issued/
8. UAS traffic data: Quantitative data (number of UAS registrations).
Source: https://www.faa.gov/foia/electronic_reading_room/#geo_list
9. The NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) UAS accident
database
10. FAA Unmanned Aircraft Systems Safety Risk Management Policy
(Order 8040.6), FAA Safety Management System (Order 8000.369B).
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Appendix B
Appendix Table A1
Data Set Used
Date

Occurrence
Type
Accident

UAS
type
Vapor 25

Country

Accident

V-10ET

Incident

MQ-9

United
States
United
States

UNKNO
WN
Arizona

10/1/201
0
5. 1/31/201
7
6. 2/18/201
7
7. 9/22/201
7
8. 2/14/201
8
9. 8/14/201
8
10. 9/11/201
8
11. 3/1/2019

Concern

Global
Hawk
RQ-7

United
States
United
States
Japan

California

12. 5/1/2018

Accident

13. 6/1/2019

1.
2.
3.

9/27/201
6
11/1/201
7
3/1/2013

4.

Accident
Accident
Accident

United
States
United
States
Israel

Causal Factors
Automated Flight Plan Waypoint
Error caused loss of aircraft
Surplus of battery current caused
crash
Automated Flight Plan Waypoint
Error caused unintended descent

Colorado

Military concerns FAA due to lack
of flight planning
Unplanned Excursion caused crash

Fujieda
City
Nevada

Lost Link caused collision with
crane
Loss of lift caused crash

South
Carolina
N/A

United
States
United
States

California
ANONY
MIZED

In flight path of manned helicopter
caused collision
Lack of deconfliction caused
collision with helicopter
Loss of GPS caused drift and crash
into building
Moving UAS while watching
payload - nearly hit radio tower

ANONY
MIZED

United
States

ANONY
MIZED

Moving UAS at low altitude while
watching payload - hit pole

Near Miss

ANONY
MIZED

United
States

ANONY
MIZED

Lack of deconfliction caused near
miss with helicopter

14. 6/1/2019

Accident
Accident

United
States
United
States

ANONY
MIZED
ANONY
MIZED

Crash into side of mountain

15. 6/25/201
9

ANONY
MIZED
ANONY
MIZED

Controller malfunction
flight stoppage

caused

16. 4/1/2019

Accident

ANONY
MIZED

United
States

ANONY
MIZED

Controller malfunction
flight stoppage

caused

17. 10/1/201
9

Near Miss

ANONY
MIZED

United
States

ANONY
MIZED

18. 4/5/2019

Incident

ANONY
MIZED

United
States

ANONY
MIZED

19. 11/1/201
9

Accident

ANONY
MIZED

United
States

ANONY
MIZED

UAS lost link caused Return to
Launch almost hitting a newly
parked vehicle
UAS forced landing into mountain
despite showing adequate battery
supply
Pilot launched and moved UAS
forward into obstacles causing crash

20. 7/1/2018

Accident

ANONY
MIZED

United
States

ANONY
MIZED

Loss of UAS GPS caused drift and
crash into building
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Incident

UNKNO
WN
DJI
Phantom
DJI
Phantom
DJI
Phantom
DJI
Phantom
ANONY
MIZED

Australia

State/Pro
vence
NSW

Accident
Accident
Near Miss
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21. 11/1/201
8

Incident

ANONY
MIZED

Select One

ANONY
MIZED

Loss of UAS GPS caused drift and
hit pole. UAS still flyable.

22. 2/6/2020

Accident

FLIR
R60

Canada

British
Columbia

Lack of deconfliction
collision with helicopter
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Appendix C
Table A2
Application of The Sierra Scale to Determine Qualifying Effect (QE) of Accident
Prevention Effort (APE) In Risk Management Of Unsafe Control Acts Themes
(UCATS).

Unsafe Control Action Themes'
(UCATS from total sample n 22)
1. Inadequate/untested software
2.
Inadequate organizational procedures
(maintenance)
3. Lack of total system testing
4. Distracted/"screen bound" Remote Pilot
5. Inadequate data entry
6. Lost C2 link
7. Inadequate C2/GPS link integrity test
8.
Lack of hardware (aircraft/battery/control
surface) testing
9. Inadequate checklist application
10. Inadequate organizational procedures (training
all crew)
11. Inadequate organizational procedures (flight)
12. Inadequate checklist
13. Inexperience in the operational area
14. Inadequate visual observer
Total Accident Prevention Effort of the sample
frame
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Frequenc
y of theme
occurrenc
e
2

Risk
Valu
e

QE

8

16

2

6

12

3
4
4
4
5

10
15
15
6
9

30
60
75
24
45

7

16

23

8

20

160

8

20

160

9
10
10
12

20
25
10
15

180
125
100
120
1130

21
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Figure A2
Unmanned Aircraft Systems' Fuzzy-based' Hazard Identification Risk Assessment
Matrix

Note. Figure adapted from Adapted from: Hazards Effects Management Process (HEMP) Risk
Assessment Matrix by J. Ahn and D. Chang (2016).
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